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Abstract  
Despite the relevance of bankruptcy law for a number of key issues regarding business 
functioning and organization, little is known about the features and evolution of these 
legal institutions over time and space. This paper starts to fill this gap in current 
knowledge by analyzing a new data set providing consistent information about key 
features of bankruptcy law between 1850 and 2015 in the thirty largest European 
economies. Regarding institutional change, our analysis supports the established view of 
a link between macroeconomic changes and the introduction of procedures alternative to 
bankruptcy. However, this process shows significant differences at the national level, 
making it difficult to support the idea of change as the result of belonging to a given legal 
system (French; common law; Scandinavia; Germanic), or the degree of economic 
development. Instead, change in bankruptcy institutions seems to be a product of, and 
contributor to, the wider process of individual state formation. Similarly, the features of 
bankruptcy procedures seem to confirm this picture: Looking at their possible outcomes, 
the right to begin proceedings, and degree of application to different types of debtors, 
national differences appear deep and persistent, despite a generalized pattern of 
convergence over time toward a less punitive approach to bankruptcy.  
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Introduction 
“In the beginning there were markets”—Oliver Williamson argued1—and the markets’ 
function par excellence is to select among firms, promoting worthy concerns and 
eliminating the unviable ones. Timelessly, and without friction and costs, an efficient 
selection among businesses and entrepreneurs is made, and economies that let the 
markets operate unfettered are allowed to prosper. However, for those who get their 
hands dirty digging into the reality of the history of business, a very different story 
emerges. The market’s function to select viable firms is, at least, mediated by, and, at 
most, fully replaced by a wide set of institutional settings. Among these institutions, the 
main player is bankruptcy (and insolvency) law.2 If we consider, as is widely recognized, 
that these institutions are a key mechanism of capitalist economies, it is perhaps not 
surprising to discover the influence they have had on fundamental aspects of business 
organization and functioning. Historically, the choices of forms of governance,3 attitudes 
toward risk-taking across class and gender,4 the development of credit markets,5 the size 
and structure of firms in various nations,6 all have been shaped by legal institutions, in 
particular the ones dealing with failure and restarting. 
Although the influence of these institutional settings on business organization has 
been (and still is) the subject of wide investigation in economic and business history, 
relatively little attention has been paid to the much broader context: the historical 
reconstruction of the features of bankruptcy laws over time and space. So, currently, we 
are unable to readily compare the fate the same firm would have faced in Britain had it 
  
3 
 
been declared bankrupted in 1850 as opposed to 1950. Similarly, we do not know what 
would have happened to a firm in, say, Sweden in the 1970s, compared to Belgium or 
Germany in the same decade.  
Just as importantly, little is known about the patterns of change of these laws over 
time. The lack of research on this topic is perhaps not surprising given the number of 
considerable methodological issues involved: the definition of the time span, the number 
of countries to be covered, the variables to be included, the fact that sources are 
dispersed, fragmented, and written in a number of different languages. Furthermore, the 
assumption that institutions naturally converge toward the most effective ones, has 
perhaps led many to believe that a reconstruction of bankruptcy and insolvency laws is 
essentially redundant. A few facts should suffice to dispel these doubts. Around the turn 
of the nineteenth century, treating a case of bankruptcy took, on average, about a year in 
England and Germany, a few more months in France, and about three times as long in 
Italy. In England, about 40 percent of firms would have used a prebankruptcy 
arrangement, about one third in France, and less than 5 percent in Italy, while in Germany 
such deals were simply not available as part of bankruptcy procedures.7 Yet, in 2016, 
more than a century later, and after the 2007–08 financial crisis had severely tested the 
functioning of insolvency regulations, it appeared that little had changed, with the 
European Commission noting that across the EU bloc, “despite reforms in the area of 
insolvency, rules still diverge and remain inefficient”8 in a number of countries. 
The absence of such research also reflects a significant gap in our understanding 
more generally of long-term institutional development in a comparative context, with 
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only a handful of studies on this topic despite the longstanding acknowledgement of their 
value to a range of disciplines. So, whereas bankruptcy and insolvency laws are key 
“rules of the game,” the issue of these institutions and patterns of change, so central to 
business history, has yet to be tackled, and the fundamental questions about the nature of 
bankruptcy laws in a comparative perspective and of their evolution over time are 
therefore still to be answered.  
The purpose of this paper is to start the challenging task of addressing this gap in 
the business history literature in two ways. First, the core contribution of the paper is the 
collation, in a consistent and systematic way, of detailed information on the most 
important features of bankruptcy and insolvency laws in the largest thirty European 
economies in a long-term perspective. The paper spans the period 1850–2015 and is 
based on qualitative information, derived from legal documents and secondary sources, 
turned into a data set of quantitative measures. Whereas a similar methodology has been 
used for an analysis limited to the core European countries for the period 1808–1914,9 
this paper expands the study to a much broader set of countries and links the trajectory of 
legislative change from the mid-nineteenth century to the current day. The aim is to 
provide researchers with a set of coherent data that can be used either in national or in 
comparative studies, both in terms of bankruptcy and insolvency law, but also in terms of 
long-term institutional change more generally. Second, information from the data set is 
also analyzed in an attempt to identify some general trends in the evolution of bankruptcy 
legislation and legal procedures over time, and present some hypothesis for possible 
causes behind such trends. Clearly within the limits of a paper such as this, it is not 
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possible to explore each of these trends in detail, however, the objective is to help move 
the debate regarding institutional change beyond the constraints of any particular 
theories, and open up new avenues for research. 
This article is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the sources and 
methodology behind the longitudinal data collection. Sections 2 and 3 use the 
information from the data set to analyze the introduction of various types of solutions 
across time and space and of their various features: who could apply to them; outcomes 
possible; conditions demanded; who made the final decision on their acceptance. Section 
4 analyzes a specific indicator—the total number of outcomes available in various 
systems—which we consider as a basic proxy of the “quality” of bankruptcy and 
insolvency institutions. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
Methodology and Definitions 
A study of this kind raises a number of significant methodological challenges. The first 
issue is the geographic focus. We adopted a strategy of covering the thirty largest 
European economies by GDP in 2015, a list of which is presented in the appendix (table 
A). The sample thus includes the majority of the twenty-eight countries being part of the 
EU in the same year (with the exclusion of Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, and Malta), plus 
other important European economies such as Norway, Russia (and Belarus), and 
Switzerland. Some of the countries included did not exist as independent (or legally 
autonomous) states for the entire period, hence the number of countries in the sample 
changes over time. Specifically, in the period up to World War I, the existence of the 
Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, and the lack of independence for some of the 
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benchmarks, of Romania or Bulgaria, reduced the number of independent (or legally 
autonomous) countries to twenty in 1850–70, twenty-one in 1890, and twenty-two in 
1915.10 The number increases to twenty-five during the interwar period, with the 
temporary independence of Lithuania and the foundation of Czechoslovakia, and of the 
State of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs (lately Yugoslavia), and remains almost the same 
until the fall of the Berlin Wall (twenty-four, as Lithuania losses its independence after 
World War II). The political fragmentation that followed results in the sample size of 
thirty. 
However, the number of observations actually included in each benchmark does 
not necessarily coincide with the number of independent or legally autonomous countries. 
For the period up to 1910, all countries are represented in the analysis; as for political 
entities that were parts of empires (or other states), we simply used data referring to 
them.11 Between the benchmark 1928 and 1975, the spread of communism in eastern 
Europe ensured these institutions disappear in some of these countries, hence the number 
of observations varies accordingly: twenty-six in 1928 and 1938, nineteen in 1950, and 
twenty-two in 1975.12 All thirty countries (with the exception of Belarus in 1995) are 
represented in the last two benchmarks, 1995 and 2015. Overall, nineteen countries are 
represented over the whole period 1850–2015. 
In terms of time span, the analysis aims to capture changes and the evolution of 
bankruptcy law over the last century and a half by providing a series of snapshots taken at 
ten benchmark years. We take 1850 as a starting point because the relevant literature 
indicates that cultural changes toward debts, and economic transformations due to the 
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Industrial Revolution, led, a couple of decades later, to a Pan-European wave of changes 
in bankruptcy and insolvency law.13 New legislations, in general, broke with traditional 
punitive ways of dealing with the issue, embracing a more tolerant and supportive 
philosophy.14 The snapshot taken in 1850, therefore, crystallizes the reality of legal 
institutions before the subsequent transformations, and allows for a comparative analysis 
of the changes. The remaining nine benchmarks have been selected to allow us to observe 
the impact of great political events in European history—such as the two world wars and 
the fall of communism—but also of the main economic transformations represented by 
the first and then second industrial revolutions (three benchmarks between 1870 and 
1914); the economic instability and crises of the interwar years (two benchmarks between 
1918 and 1939); the “Golden Age” of European economic growth (two benchmarks 
between 1950 and 1970); and the end of communism and the advent of the recent wave 
of globalization (benchmarks 1995 and 2015). 
In regards to the type of data collected and studied, the very wide scope of our 
analysis forced us to focus exclusively on “formal” aspects of bankruptcy, that is, the 
features of the official procedures contained in legislation. We are fully aware that such 
an approach comes with limitations: Historically, in some countries formal institutions 
were rarely used while, allegedly, extrajudicial solutions were very popular. Although a 
systematic study of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, where possible the paper 
refers to available information on the nature of enforcement mechanisms and actual 
functioning of procedures, in order to give the reader at least a sense of the degree of 
usage of formal solutions to bankruptcy. 
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In order to study formal aspects of legislations, we start by defining three ideal 
types of solutions (bankruptcy procedure; prebankruptcy procedure; businesses 
relaunching procedure) and then analyze when these appeared in the countries under 
analysis, and which specific characteristics they took.  
Bankruptcy procedure in the narrow sense is the traditional and basic channel to 
deal with insolvent or illiquid firms and businesses. It requires a formal declaration of 
bankruptcy and is a full judicial remedy, in the sense that it takes place in a court. Even 
this basic solution, however, can vary in its practical implementation. Among key 
aspects, historical literature has looked at the issue of the possible outcomes of the 
procedure, its coverage in terms of legal entities allowed to use it, and who had the right 
to open it. Traditionally, bankruptcy was based on the liquidation of the debtor’s business 
and the sale of its assets but, over time, legal systems started allowing also the possibility 
of closing the procedure via a settlement with the creditors comprising the repayment of a 
given percentage of the debts. This was a very important change, with nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century commentators stressing the key role of this solution in increasing 
the overall efficiency of bankruptcy procedures, in particular in terms of reducing waiting 
time and increasing payments to creditors.15 Therefore, in the paper, we record for each 
benchmark whether or not bankruptcy allowed for a composition as well as liquidation. 
Another key aspect of bankruptcy relates to its application. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, and up to the 1930s, fierce debates arose among legal scholars, both 
in common and civil law countries, on whether this solution should have been reserved 
for merchants (or traders), as common in French-derived legislation, or open to all 
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categories, as was the case in England after 1861 or Germany since 1877.16 Considering 
that nontraders, in general, were exposed to a much stricter legislation, opening up 
bankruptcy to them was part of a generalized attempt at mitigating conditions for debtors 
that characterized much of the later nineteenth-century reforms. This approach was the 
result of the growing awareness of two facts. The first one, that economic failure was not 
necessarily the result of misfortune. Second, that encouraging honest yet unlucky debtors 
to use the bankruptcy system would have generated advantages to creditors by limiting 
the use of extrajudicial solutions or the dissipations of resources via procrastination over 
the declaration of bankruptcy.17 Connected to this point, a third fundamental aspect of 
bankruptcy procedure concerns its opening. Traditionally, it was up to creditors to declare 
the bankruptcy of debtors but, over time, debtors were allowed to make the first move 
themselves or, in other cases, courts could act independently. In the paper, we thus collect 
information on this aspect, recording whether bankruptcy law applied to all creditors or 
just to some specific groups, as well as information about the right to start the procedure.  
The introduction of prebankruptcy proceedings or arrangements,18 the second ideal 
type of procedure we use in the paper, is considered one of the major institutional 
changes occurring in the history of bankruptcy.19 These solutions represented an 
alternative and parallel path (although in various cases failing to obtain it pushed debtors 
back to the bankruptcy track) requiring an agreement with (a variable majority of) 
creditors to be reached before the actual declaration of bankruptcy. The agreement was 
supervised by the court and, often, also subject to its approval. Some early examples of 
these procedures were the concordat préventif in Belgium (1883), the deeds of 
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arrangements in England (1887), and the liquidation judiciaire in France (1889). As 
compared to bankruptcy procedures, these solutions had in common the aspect that they 
do not lead to the formal declaration of bankruptcy for debtors. This avoided the need for 
debtors to be “rehabilitated” in order to run businesses and, in countries such as France 
and England, the loss of civil and economic rights that came with the legal condition of a 
bankrupt.20 As with bankruptcy, these proceedings differed in various ways among 
countries. Although geared toward reaching a settlement over payment of a given share 
of debts, in some legal systems they could also allow for the liquidation of the creditor’s 
business. This key difference is recorded and analyzed in the paper. A second difference 
concerned ex ante conditions (usually guarantees to be able to pay at least a given share 
of unsecured debts) that had to be respected in order for a prebankruptcy procedure to be 
allowed. Historical research has showed that such conditions could dramatically reduce 
the usage of these procedures, as was the case in Italy or England before compositions 
before bankruptcy were replaced by deeds of arrangements.21 
The third ideal type of procedure we analyze in the paper are solutions to 
bankruptcy specifically aimed at keeping businesses alive and relaunching them, what in 
the paper we call relaunching procedures. A milestone in the history of the evolution of 
bankruptcy is the understanding that a firm has a higher value as an ongoing concern 
compared to the sum of the market price of its individual assets, and that saving a firm 
avoids the economic and social costs that come with business liquidation via specific 
procedures.22 In looking at this type of solution, a key distinction must be made between 
proper prelaunching procedures and the prebankruptcy procedures described above. 
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Although in contemporary debates the latter are often seen as company-restructuring 
devices because of the option of keeping firms alive by reaching a settlement, it is very 
clear that historically this was not the case, and business relaunch was not their aim. As 
stressed by contemporaries and by historical literature, these procedures were, instead, 
part of the trend described above, aiming at reaching better deals for creditors by offering 
debtors less punitive solutions.23 Instead, examples of the business-saving approach 
characterized different solutions, such as the English administration or receivership, the 
Belgian administration controlee, and the Italian amministrazione controllata. These 
procedures vary in nature, but they all rely on some or all of the following elements: a 
period of “freeze,” when creditors are not allowed to push the business into bankruptcy 
(debt moratorium); the conversion of credits into securities of a new company, which 
replaces the one in distress; the provision of an industrial plan for the future; and the 
replacement of existing management. In this paper, we record when these institutions 
started appearing and what form they took. In particular, we distinguish between the 
introduction of the mere debt moratorium (often unable to address the problem of 
business relaunch, and in very limited use) and the appearance of more complex 
solutions. 
Finally, as a synthetic measure, we analyze the number of possible outcomes 
offered in each country at each benchmark as a way of assessing the menu of options 
available to deal with bankruptcy at that time. To calculate this variable, we add the total 
number of procedures (prebankruptcy, bankruptcy, and relaunching), also taking into 
account their possible outcomes. So, for instance, a country where there is a 
  
12 
 
prebankruptcy procedure that can only lead to composition and where bankruptcy 
procedure can lead to liquidation or composition, and there are also two different 
relaunching procedures, will have a total of five outcomes (one for prebankruptcy, plus 
two for bankruptcy, and plus two for relaunching).24 
The approach we take in this paper is based on the following steps. Using a wide 
set of secondary sources (sources are described in the appendix), first we populate table 
A (in the appendix), which records which law applied at each country/benchmark, the 
changes (or lack of) vis-à-vis the previous country/benchmark, and the sources we used 
in each case. Because of the nonhistorical nature of some sources, for each 
benchmark/nation we cross-referenced at least two sources (when possible). 
Changes in the legislation are considered only in the following cases: 
• Provision of new legislation replacing the previous one. We use this definition 
even when, as in many communist countries, the previous legislation has not been 
active for a period of time. 
• Introduction of a prebankruptcy or relaunching procedure, when distinct from the 
introduction of a bankruptcy law.  
• Changes in one key aspects of the procedures described above (possible 
outcomes; opening of the procedure; inclusion of different types of debtors; ex 
ante conditions) 
This specific definition of “change” results in the omission of some cases of 
known reforms that have been identified in the literature,25 and does not fully capture the 
dynamics of change in common law countries, where judges attitudes could deeply 
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influence the meaning and actual functioning of procedures.26 Despite these limitations, 
we believe that the criteria we have adopted for “change” enables the identification of the 
main episodes of institutional change in a consistent way. 
The second step of our analysis (in section 2) consists of charting such change 
across time and countries in order to try to identify possible similarities and to look at the 
relationship between economic, political, and legal transformations. 
In the third step of the analysis, for each country/benchmark, we use a wider set 
of sources, which also includes primary sources such as laws and acts (either in the 
original language or translated,) to analyze the details of the legislation in order to 
populate the spreadsheet. 27 This information is then analyzed in sections 3, 4, and 5. 
Institutional Change: The Nature of Legislative Process 
In this section we analyze the evolution of bankruptcy law across European countries in 
terms of year of introduction and number and types of changes. The aim is to capture 
features such as the existence of national trends, as well as the persistence of institutions 
when facing exogenous shocks.  
When Countries Passed a National Legislation “First”  
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, bankruptcy norms included in the French 
commercial code of 1808 were the basic model for most European countries and were 
directly used in Belgium, Switzerland, and some of the German states. By the 1850s, 
however, a process of establishment of national laws was well underway, although when 
this process was initiated differs between countries. We can posit various potential 
reasons for this: the degree of political and institutional stability of each nation, the state 
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of its economic development, and, as suggested by dominant economic literature, the 
belonging to a specific “legal family” (French; Anglo-Saxon (common law); 
Scandinavian; German).28 Table A shows that at the first benchmark (1850), more than 
70 percent of the countries included in the sample29 had a national specific system of 
bankruptcy procedures—although not necessarily a freestanding bankruptcy law, as 
sometimes norms were part of the commercial code or provided via “ordinances.” By the 
following benchmark (1870)—and with the inclusion of Belgium, Germany, Norway, 
Finland, and Ireland—nearly all the countries in the sample (around 90 percent) had 
implemented a national bankruptcy system. Two countries (Romania and Switzerland) 
completed the process by the following benchmark, with Bulgaria passing a national law 
by the 1910 benchmark.  
In seeking possible explanations for these results, the issue of “legal family” does 
not appear to be significant, as the pattern of institutional change shows little evidence of 
clustering according to specific legal groups.30 Similarly, the degree of economic 
development appears a poor explanation, if we consider that relatively backward 
countries such as Russia, Poland, and Spain had national legislation before emerging 
industrial powers such as Germany or Belgium. What appears to be the case is that the 
establishment of a national commercial code and a bankruptcy law was an important 
component in the process of state building, as the advent of political stability (or the age 
of consolidation of state power) seems concurrent with the appearance of national legal 
institutions in this field. The process displayed a complex relationship with the existing 
models. For instance, whereas Italy and Greece de facto almost simply translated the 
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French code in an attempt at demonstrating their consolidation as advanced economies, 
Belgium and Holland tried to mark their independence by making nation-specific 
changes to the law they had inherited from their previous rulers.31  
Changes by Country 
Other than the date of introduction of the initial bankruptcy law, another interesting 
aspect is the number of changes over time as defined in the previous section. Figure 1 
below plots, for each country, the number of changes from the 1870 benchmark onward. 
Likewise, the timing of the introduction of bankruptcy procedures gives some indication 
as to the validity of the idea that belonging to a specific legal family might dictate some 
similarities in the process of institutional (legal) change. 
Figure 1 Number of total changes to bankruptcy law by country: 1870–2015 
Note: Change defined as: 1) provision of new legislation replacing the previous one; 2) 
introduction of a prebankruptcy or relaunching procedure, when distinct from the 
introduction of a bankruptcy law; 3) changes in one of these aspects: possible outcomes 
of procedures; opening of the procedure; inclusion of different types of debtors; ex ante 
conditions. 
Data sources: See text. 
The evidence from Ireland and England, displaying six and five changes 
respectively against a modal range of three changes, at first glance suggests that their 
“legal family” might have played a role, but this stands at odds with other cases. For 
instance, clear differences exist between Norway and Sweden (respectively three and five 
changes), despite their cultural ties and belonging to the same legal family. At the same 
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time, collective political stability seems to be a good explanation for similarities—for 
instance in the three Benelux countries, the basic legal frameworks were based on late 
nineteenth-century laws (with some changes in the 1930s) for most of the period, and in 
general, these countries show a limited number of changes. On the other hand, countries 
formerly belonging to Yugoslavia (Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia) and to a lesser extent 
Czech Republic display relatively high numbers of changes, but this appears to be in line 
with a common history of multiple political changes, rather than the collective belonging 
to a legal family.  
Changes by Benchmark and the Introduction of “Alternative” Procedures 
Instances of legal change not only differ across countries but also chronologically, with 
phases of rapid changes between periods of calm. Figure 2 plots the number of changes 
occurring at each benchmark as percentage of the number of existing independent (or 
legally autonomous) countries.  
Figure 2 Number of changes to bankruptcy per benchmark years as percentage of the 
number of countries included in the sample 
Data source: See text. 
Figure 2 shows a period of a high and growing number of changes up to World 
War I, followed by another (lower) peak at the end of the 1930s. After a long period of 
calm after World War II, the process of legal reforms gathered fresh momentum from the 
1990s onward, with the number of changes being the absolute highest in 2015. 
The period up to 1910 was a phase of deep economic change with profound 
technological transformation that characterized the Second Industrial Revolution. As 
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argued in section 1, these economic changes progressively revealed the inadequacy of 
traditional punitive bankruptcy law, and triggered institutional transformation. This took 
place mainly via the introduction of alternative prebankruptcy procedures. Figure 3 
shows the share of countries that, at a given point in time, had such procedures. The 
figure gives data both for the total sample at that point in time, and for the countries that 
are constantly present in the sample from 1850 onward.  
Figure 3 Share of countries having prebankruptcy procedures 
Note: Prebankruptcy procedures defined as solutions leading to either liquidation or 
requiring an agreement with (a variable majority of) creditors to be reached before the 
actual declaration of bankruptcy. 
Data source: See text. 
While in 1850 only a limited percentage (about twenty per cent) of countries had 
such procedures, by 1910 this had risen to about 60 percent, something that helps explain 
the high number of changes occurring to bankruptcy laws during this time. It must be 
noted, however, that the process of introducing these procedures continued after World 
War II, with the share of countries having at least one type of prebankruptcy solution 
jumping to more than 80 percent in 1950 for the total sample. These results offer some 
qualification to the established view linking the introduction of prebankruptcy procedures 
to an awareness of the inadequacy of traditional remedies in a rapidly changing economic 
environment. The institutional response to similar economic and cultural changes took 
place along national lines, and according to internal national considerations. Among 
them, we can include the approach to the German codes, which emerged as a leading 
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alternative to the French model32 and did not include prebankruptcy procedures. In 
conclusion, the process of institutional convergence suggested by the literature is still 
visible,33 but it appears much slower and more complex when the sample of countries is 
expanded. 
In order to explain the timing in the changes occurring to bankruptcy law, we have 
to consider another institutional change occurring in the period up to World War I: the 
introduction of what we defined as relaunching procedures. Figure 4 plots the percentage 
of nations that, at a given point in time, had such procedures. The figure gives data both 
for the total sample at that point in time, and for the countries that are constantly present 
in the sample from 1850 onward. 
Figure 4 Share of countries having a relaunching procedure (including Moratorium) 
Note: Relaunching procedures defined as solutions to bankruptcy specifically aimed at 
keeping business alive and relaunching them. 
Data source: See text. 
Our data, independently of which sample we consider, shows a clear increase, with 
the biggest jump occurring in 1910. This picture stands at odds with the idea that major 
economic shocks—specifically the 1930s Great Depression—triggered such legal 
change. Evidence of a possible link between the 1930s crisis and the need to introduce 
legal devices to support businesses in trouble could be found, at first glance, in the tone 
(and even the title) of coeval literature both in Europe and the United States.34 as well as 
in the almost parallel introduction of this type of procedure in various countries, for 
instance Belgium (1934) and Italy (1942). Our data, however, does not support the 
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existence of such a clear-cut connection. This result is, in part, due to having included 
among this type of procedure typically nineteenth-century remedies such as debt 
moratorium. Such devices had little practical use or effectiveness, as clearly shown in the 
cases of nineteenth-century Netherlands or Italy, where businesses could apply to such a 
procedure only when the assets exceeded the liabilities.35 Yet, however ineffective, the 
early introduction of these devices can be seen as evidence of the fact that policy makers 
seem to have been concerned with the issue of avoiding undue liquidations of firms 
earlier than we previously believed. Furthermore, the lack of concurrence between the 
introduction of relaunching procedures and the Great Depression can also be explained 
by considering that the 1930s economic shocks probably stimulated adaptations to 
existing institutions rather than triggering the introduction of entirely new ones.36 This 
conclusion is supported by nation-level evidence: In Belgium, for example, the 
Administration Contrôlé was introduced in 1934 but only for two years; in Italy special 
case was made for banks and insurances, but there was no reshaping of bankruptcy law 
overall; whereas in England, as stressed by contemporary commentators, “the … 
economic crises produced no basic change.”37 
The benchmark years in the Golden Age (1950 and 1975) are notable for their lack 
of changes, and this is confirmed by our data. This is unsurprising given the existence of 
communist states and the long-term stable economic growth during the period.  
The increase in the number of changes from benchmark years 1975 and 1995 is 
clearly caused by the collapse of communism and its aftermath, with the emergence of 
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new capitalist European nations, which required the institutions to deal with business 
failure. 
The 2007–8 financial crisis is one of the main causes of the high number of 
changes for the 2015 benchmark. However, many of the changes relate to postcommunist 
nations. The data supports the argument that their initial postcommunist bankruptcy laws 
in the 1990s were hastily formulated institutions that struggled to cope with the economic 
volatility of the period, and consequently underperformed. Specifically, data on the 
number of outcomes available by law (arguably the most relevant synthetic statistic about 
the “quality” of bankruptcy institutions) shows a sharp rise between 1995 and 2015 for 
postcommunist countries (see sections below for details).38 
Institutional features: procedures across time and space 
The introduction of legal institutions across time and space, analyzed in the previous 
section, does not seem to indicate that European countries smoothly converged toward 
similar architectures, but rather it highlights the extent to which national trends shaped 
different paths of development. To analyze these issues, we consider some of the features 
of various institutional devices (bankruptcy and prebankruptcy procedures). 
Bankruptcy 
The first aspect we investigate is the share of countries whose bankruptcy procedure 
could lead to either a liquidation of the debtor’s business or an agreement (settlement) 
with creditors—a solution often believed to be a “softer” alternative for debtors. Figure 5 
shows, specifically, the share of countries whose bankruptcy procedure could end up with 
liquidation of the debtor’s assets or a composition with creditors. 
  
21 
 
Figure 5 Share of countries whose bankruptcy procedure could lead to either liquidation 
or settlement 
Data source: See text. 
The data shows that already by the 1850 benchmark, and contrary to the image of 
traditional bankruptcy law as oriented toward liquidation, the vast majority of countries 
(between 80 and 95 percent depending on the sample considered) also allowed for a 
settlement. Up to 1975, this share remains fairly constant among the nineteen countries 
always represented in the sample, while for the total sample it seems to decline and 
increase again, while never going below 60 percent. In the last two benchmarks this share 
declines as some western countries always contained in the sample adopted liquidation-
only bankruptcy procedures (Switzerland–2015 and Portugal–1995), as did a number of 
eastern European states postcommunism—Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Romania. Hence, the decline appears more marked when the total sample is considered. It 
should be pointed out that the persistency, and occasional introduction of liquidation-only 
bankruptcy procedures in the last two benchmarks, can be explained by the parallel 
introduction of ad hoc measures to relaunch companies outside the main bankruptcy 
pathway, for example via the use of prebankruptcy procedures or equivalent institutional 
devices. As such, the recent trend seems to indicate the introduction of more polarized 
and specific solutions, leaving bankruptcy the role of pure liquidation for extreme cases. 
As far as the application of bankruptcy law was concerned, figure 6 shows the 
share of countries whose bankruptcy law was open to all debtors, and therefore did not 
distinguish between traders and nontraders.  
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Figure 6 Share of countries whose bankruptcy procedure applied to all types of debtors 
Data source: See text. 
Irrespective of the sample considered, the data shows a very clear upward trend to 
1938 (with the share passing from 30–40 percent to 70–80 percent), followed by a slight 
decline to around 60 percent in 2015. The trend confirms the established view of a 
progressive opening of procedures to a wider set of debtors (typically to nontraders), 
which led to lawmakers adopting a less punitive attitude, and the acceptance of the fact 
that bankruptcy was not necessarily an act of fraud. The data also illustrates the relative 
slowness of this process: By World War I, about 40 percent of the countries in the sample 
still discriminated among debtors. The most recent benchmark, 2015, suggests a change 
of direction with access to bankruptcy procedures becoming more selective. This change, 
rather than a reversal in the attitude toward debtors, can be explained by the parallel 
introduction of dedicated solutions for specific categories, confirming the pattern of an 
increasing number of more specialized solutions noted above. 
Another dimension of bankruptcy concerns who has the legal right to initiate the 
procedure. Figure 7 plots the share of countries, for each benchmark, in which a given set 
of actors (only debtors; only creditors; only courts; debtors and creditors; debtors and 
courts; debtors, creditors, and courts) could initiate a bankruptcy procedure. 
Figure 7 Entities allowed to start bankruptcy procedures in various countries (as 
percentages of the number of countries considered). 
Data source: See text. 
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Overall, countries moved along a consistent trajectory of evolving from a situation 
with the power largely in the hands of creditors to a more balanced situation in which 
debtors and creditors (and court) could make the decision. So while the share of countries 
where only creditors could activate bankruptcy procedures declines over time (eventually 
disappearing in 2015), legal systems in which the decision could have been made by 
either debtors or creditors increases over time (with some fluctuations between 1938 and 
1975) to become the most common situation in 2015. This evolution mirrors the pattern 
of the share of countries in which all subjects (debtors, creditors, court) were allowed to 
open procedures—this also increases over time, albeit with a slight decline in favor of the 
debtors/creditors from the 1950s. Court or debtors-only solutions appear in only a small 
number of instances, and a combination of the two is virtually nonexistent. This pattern 
suggests two things: first, the increasing attempts at making debtors collaborate with the 
functioning of official procedures that, at the same time, progressively lose their purely 
punitive nature; second, the consistent (possibly growing) role given to courts as a 
potentially “neutral” referee in terms of their ability to start procedures independently 
once the option is given to creditors and debtors also.  
Prebankruptcy Procedures 
A second area we can explore relates to the features of what we defined as prebankruptcy 
procedures. In particular, we are able to analyze two key aspects: the possible outcomes 
of these procedures and the existence of official preconditions for their acceptance by the 
courts or creditors. Figure 8 shows the relative share of countries for which 
prebankruptcy could lead to liquidation, composition, or both.39  
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Figure 8 Possible outcomes of prebankruptcy procedures (as percentage of countries 
having a prebankruptcy procedure) 
Data source: See text. 
The figure shows a revealing pattern. At the beginning of the period (1850), in the 
very few countries where prebankruptcy procedures existed, their outcome was equally 
divided between composition or composition and liquidation. In the following two 
decades, however, these types of procedures became common in most countries, but 
often directed toward liquidation (60 percent of cases in 1870), confirming their 
structurally different role vis-à-vis relaunching procedures. As argued by contemporaries, 
at their introduction, prebankruptcy procedures were not intended as devices to promote 
the relaunch of businesses, rather as a quicker, and probably less expensive—given the 
limited involvement of courts in the process—ways to collect debts.40 This role changes 
around the 1910s, when in about two-thirds of countries these procedures turned into pro-
settlement ones, and accelerated since the 1950 when liquidations in prebankruptcy 
procedures disappear. However, in about one-third of the cases these procedures keep the 
double outcome of liquidation or settlement, suggesting that their transformation into 
relaunching mechanisms is still noncomplete. Regarding this point, it is interesting to 
note how this feature varies even within a group of countries sharing the same legal 
background. For instance, common law countries (Ireland and England) have two 
solutions for a long time, but Ireland adopts the settlement-only pattern after 1995. 
Conversely, France and Spain both have the dual track system, but not Belgium—one of 
the most important French-law countries. Within Scandinavia, Sweden has two solutions 
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but Denmark only one, whereas Germany is a famous case of a total absence of such 
procedures for a long period (prebankruptcy procedures were only introduced in 1938). 
The final variable we analyze is whether or not prebankruptcy procedures were 
subject to the fulfilling of some ex ante conditions in terms of guaranteeing the payment 
of a share of unsecured debts. This is a fundamental issue, as ex ante conditions could 
have been a major deterrent to the use of these procedures and determined their degree of 
adoption across various countries.41 Figure 9 plots the share of countries having 
prebankruptcy procedures subject to ex ante conditions. 
Figure 9 Share of countries in which prebankruptcy procedures were subject to ex ante 
conditions (in percentage of the number of countries having a prebankruptcy procedure) 
Data Source: See text. 
At the beginning of the period, all countries which had adopted such procedures 
imposed no conditions, but a rapid change is visible between 1910 and 1928. Although 
still in a minority of countries (20 percent to 40 percent depending on the sample), the 
practice of having ex ante conditions became more common. This share stabilizes in the 
countries always present in the sample (apart from an increase to about 30 percent in 
1995), while fluctuating to a great degree in the total sample. By 2015, both cohorts end 
up at a similar level. A possible interpretation of this pattern stems from considering the 
changing nature of these procedures over time. As long as they are simply used as a more 
efficient and cheaper alternative to straight bankruptcy no strings are attached to them. 
However, when such procedures start to show a clearer settlement-oriented pattern, then 
legislators feel the need to add stronger protection for creditors, as well as norms 
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signaling the relative higher quality of creditors allowed to use softer solutions. When 
looking at specific national case studies, it seems hard to establish a general rule: 
Conditions are imposed for a long time in England, Italy, and Portugal, but for instance, 
not in France. 
Number of outcomes 
In this section, we analyze the pattern of the total number of possible solutions to the 
problem of insolvency as defined in section 1. The general assumption we adopt is that 
the greater the number of outcomes available, the greater the ability of bankruptcy 
institutions to deal with complex situations in which a one-size-fits-all approach is not 
efficient. As such, we use the number of outcomes as a generic proxy for the 
sophistication and “quality” of bankruptcy institutions and we explore the possibility that 
such “quality” evolved, over time and space, parallel to the increasing growth and 
complexity of the economies. 
To analyze, in general, the evolution of the variable over time, in table 1 we 
provide the descriptive statistics of our sample.42  
Table 1 here 
 Table 1 shows a clear trend toward increase over time: The average number of 
total outcomes increased from 2.2 in 1850 to 4.3 in 2015, when also the overall maximum 
(7) is the highest ever. The slight decline in 1950 and 1975 can be explained by the 
growing presence of communist countries for which this variable takes the value of zero. 
This pattern suggests that, in general, more solutions to bankruptcy and insolvency have 
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been put in place as the complexity of the economies increases although the direction of 
causality remains to be established. 
In table 2, we analyze the relation between economic and institutional development 
by providing, for five selected benchmark years, the average number of outcomes by 
countries grouped by quartiles according to levels of GDP per capita in each year. In 
order to obtain consistent national estimates of GDP, we have only included in the table 
countries that were independent at each benchmark.  
Table 2 here 
Results in table 2 confirm our hypothesis: Over time, countries grouped in the 
highest quartiles (Q1) of the distribution of GDP per capita also appear to have, in 
general, a wider menu of solutions to deal with insolvency and bankruptcy. In fact, the 
standard deviation of the variable appears to be lower for richer countries, suggesting also 
a higher degree of consistency of the quality of legal institutions among richer 
economies. Again, although the direction of causality remains to be established, it 
appears that more complex economies also possess more efficient legal settings. 
To better understand the nature of the evolution in the number of outcomes across 
time and space, it is worthwhile analyzing whether differences existed across countries 
and country groupings. Table 3 below shows the number of outcomes at various 
benchmarks for groups of countries. 
Table 3 here 
In terms of the five largest economies of western Europe (by nominal GDP), 
England tends to show the highest number of outcomes, whereas Spain generally exhibits 
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the lowest. Germany has a relatively low number of outcomes available over most of the 
period this research covers, largely because prebankruptcy solutions became available 
much later than in other advanced countries. Again, there seems quite a degree of 
variation between these countries in terms of number of outcomes and when changes 
occur. 
The ex-communist states show some of the most pronounced increases between 
benchmarks. Their mean number of outcomes tends to be below the overall mean for the 
thirty-country sample—this is particularly true for the benchmark year 1995 but less so 
for 2015. The increase in the number of outcomes for 2015 compared to 1995 again 
suggests that relatively poor quality institutions were constructed in the immediate 
postcommunist period, probably to try and quickly gain legitimacy among Western 
countries, followed by progressive improvement. 
Grouping countries according to different criteria such as common socioeconomic 
characteristics, physical proximity, or cultural profiles also generates some interesting 
results. For example, the Benelux countries display very similar trends in the growth of 
the number of outcomes (which is consistent with trends for other variables), and these 
values remain relatively stable across the period. Similarly, the group of Russia, Ukraine, 
Lithuania, and Belarus exhibit fairly similar patterns of outcomes across the period 
although, in contrast to the Benelux countries, the number of outcomes is persistently 
low—far below the mean in most instances. However, as with other aspects considered in 
this paper, in other country groupings where one might expect to see similarities in the 
number of outcomes, this is not the case. For instance, the Scandinavian countries are 
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very similar for 1870 and 1890, but from 1910 onward the number of outcomes for each 
county differs  quite noticeably.  Similarly, apart from the period 1910 to 1950, the data 
for England and Ireland is perhaps less closely related than expected, particularly as 
Ireland only gained independence from the UK in 1922. 
Conclusions 
Despite its relevance for the historical analysis of business organization and performance, 
little is known about the evolution across time and space of bankruptcy and insolvency 
laws. This paper offers a fresh contribution to this topic by providing a new and detailed 
picture of such evolution in Europe between the 1850s and 2015.  
The aim is to help scholars undertaking analysis of business organization, 
entrepreneurship, or creditors protection within individual nations (looking at Italy, 
Britain, Germany, or comparing a handful of countries) by offering them data that 
enables such case studies to be placed in a wider comparative context. 
The paper also provides some insight into the nature of institutional change in an 
area of key interest for business historians. In this regard, we can conclude that the data 
suggests the existence of a Pan-European phenomenon of institutional convergence, 
almost completed before World War I, centered around the introduction of procedure 
alternatives to bankruptcy, their opening to nontraders, and the progressive involvement 
of debtors in the functioning of procedures. This early trend of homogenizing the level of 
protection of creditors and investors seems to be a relatively strong explanation for the 
features of long-term institutional change. 
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“Path-dependency” in institutional change is certainly visible in some examples, 
such as the Netherlands, where the law only sporadically changed, but almost 
unnoticeable in other cases. The same can be said for external shocks. As expected, 
periods of economic stability, such as the post–World War II Golden Age, saw very little 
institutional change, while the industrialization of economies up to 1913 was paralleled 
by rapid and deep transformations in the law. On the other hand, the 1930s Great 
Depression left a lighter mark than usually assumed, and external economic events had 
very different impacts across nations. The missing link between the role of shocks and 
path-dependency of institutional change is likely to be in the realm of politics. In this 
paper we do not study this variable directly at a national level, but the evidence from the 
timing of the introduction of bankruptcy laws, as well as the effect of the fall of 
communism, clearly show that the process of state formation (hence, consolidation of the 
national institutional setting as a whole) had a clear and visible contribution. 
Therefore, the central message of this paper is that in order to fully understand the 
evolution of institutional architectures, in this case the bankruptcy and insolvency laws, 
an approach is required that pays proper attention to the specific characteristics of these 
systems over time and avoids the trap of simplistic generalizations. 
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Appendix 
Sources 
Whenever possible, we directly consulted the actual law, either in the original language 
or translated. This was possible in the following cases: Holland, 1896; Finland, 2004; 
Ireland, 1872, 1988; Italy, 1842, 1938, 1942, 2006: Serbia, 2004, 2010; Spain, 1885, 
1922; UK, 1914, 1986, 2002; Ukraine, 1992. 
For the nineteenth century, commercial laws of some countries were published 
with a comment in their original language alongside a translation in either French or 
English, in collections of volumes titled The commercial laws of the world (in English) or 
Les lois commerciales de l’univers (in French). These volumes, published between 1911 
and 1914, represented an important source for the reconstruction of the features of laws 
for countries such as Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Norway, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Poland. For the same period, vital 
information could also be extracted from summaries of legislations published annually 
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(in French) in a bulletin edited by the Société de Législation Comparé titled Annuaire de 
législation étrangère.  
For the period after World War II, European Commission documentation has been 
a key source in the form of sponsored country reports collectively entitled Bankruptcy 
and a fresh start: stigma on failure and legal consequences of bankruptcy. Although 
geared toward contemporary issues and policy implications, these reports also provided, 
often in a very sketchy way, a summary of the historical evolution of bankruptcy and 
insolvency law.  
For both periods, information derived from these sources has been cross-checked 
and integrated with that available from contemporary or modern comparative analyses, 
national reports, and various academic studies. Overall, more than one hundred different 
sources have been consulted. The full list of sources (beyond the ones included in the 
references) used to generate the database is available from the authors upon request. 
<Table A here> 
 
1 Williamson, The Economic Institutions, 87. 
2 In the nontechnical language, and sometimes in the academic literature, bankruptcy and 
insolvency tend to be used as synonyms. In fact, the two terms can have different 
meanings. First, whereas the former indicates a legal status, the latter refers more to an 
economic condition (the inability to face debt), which might not necessarily lead to 
formal bankruptcy (see Telfer, Ruin and Redemption, 5). Second, as discussed in the 
paper, in countries where traders are separated from nontraders, the former are subject to 
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bankruptcy law, and the latter to insolvency (Brown, “Comparative legislation,” 251). 
Finally, in Anglo-Saxon legal regimes, a technical distinction is made between 
incorporated businesses (subject to insolvency) and individuals, sole ownerships and 
partnerships, which are dealt with via bankruptcy law. In this paper, we use the term 
“bankruptcy,” although in the case of England and Ireland, however, we also analyze 
insolvency legislation applying to incorporated business. We do not analyze insolvency 
as the set of legal devices dealing with nontraders or other legal entities not subject to 
bankruptcy law. 
3 Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, “Legal Regime and Contractual Flexibility.” 
4 Aston and Di Martino, “Risk and success”; Di Martino, “Legal Institutions.” 
5 Musacchio, “Can Civil Law Countries Get Good Institutions?”; Freeman, Pearson, and 
Taylor, “Different and Better?”; Fohlin, “Does Civil Law Tradition.” 
6 Di Martino and Vasta, “Companies’ Insolvency.” 
7 Di Martino and Hautcoeur, “The Functioning of Bankruptcy Law.” 
8 European Commission, A Second Chance for Entrepreneurs. 
9 Sgard, “Do Legal Origins Matter?” 
10 For the current UK we use just England and Wales. Both Scotland and Northern 
Ireland (NI) have their own legal systems, which, although similar to English law, do 
exhibit differences in terms of bankruptcy procedures. However, neither Scotland nor NI 
are currently independent nations, therefore they have not been included in the sample. 
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The Republic of Ireland was part of the UK until 1922, but since 1870 it was covered by 
separate legislation. Hungary benefited from autonomy since the beginning of the period. 
11 In this regard, the benchmark 1850 was challenging. As Germany did not exist as a 
nation state prior to 1871, Prussia has been used as a proxy for the benchmark years 1850 
and 1870. Similarly, the Kingdom of Sardinia has been used as a proxy for Italy for the 
year 1850 as the modern Italian State was created in 1861. Also, we have been unable to 
find precise information on the Austrian 1781 law (which also applied to Serbia, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Croatia), whereas in Norway customary nonrecorded 
norms applied. To solve these problems, for Austria we considered, instead, the 1853 
law, passed only three years after the benchmark. For Norway, we used instead Sweden 
as a proxy, given the strong influence this country had on the development of Norwegian 
legislation. For instance, the 1863 Norwegian bankruptcy law was considered at the time 
as widely influenced by the Swedish act passed just one year earlier (see Hoechster, 
Manuel de droit commercial Francais et étranger). In Romania and Bulgaria, the Turkish 
1850 commercial code applied until these countries passed their own commercial codes 
(Lyon-Caen and Renault, Traité de droit commercial). 
12 It is interesting to note that, although bankruptcy was conceptually impossible during 
communism, some countries had laws to deal with the phenomenon. Precommunist law 
in Poland and Romania was not abolished under communism, while a new legislation 
was passed in 1970s Yugoslavia. In these cases, although these institutions rarely were 
used, we collected information and included then in the database. Also, we note that no 
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information was available for independent Lithuania between World War I and World 
War II. 
13 Sgard, “Do Legal Origins Matter?” 
14 Di Martino and Hautcoeur, “The Functioning of Bankruptcy Law”; Sgard, “Do Legal 
Origins Matter?” 
15 Rezzara, Il concordato nella storia, nella dottrina, nella giurisprudenza; Bolaffio, Il 
concordato preventivo. 
16 Brown, “Comparative legislation in Bankruptcy”; del Marmol, La faillite en Droit 
Anglo-saxon; Bolaffio, A proposito della riforma del fallimento. 
17 For similar opinions, see Robert De la liquidation judiciaire des sociétés, 1–2; 
Bolaffio, Il concordato preventivo, quoted by Di Martino and Hautcouer, “The 
Functioning of Bankruptcy Law,” 583. For analysis of the impact of cultural change on 
the severity of bankruptcy, see, among many others, Duffy, Bankruptcy and Insolvency in 
London, and Lester, Victorian Insolvency. 
18 Although similar in meaning, these solutions have been called different names, such as 
nonbankruptcy arrangements or compositions, or pre-insolvency proceedings or 
arrangements. 
19 Sgard, “Do Legal Origins Matter?”; De ruysscher, “At the End, the Creditors Win.” 
20 See Brown, “Comparative Legislation in Bankruptcy” for France, and Radin, 
“Discharge in Bankruptcy,” for England. 
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21 Di Martino, “Approaching Disaster”; Di Martino and Hautcoeur, “The Functioning of 
Bankruptcy Law.” 
22 Bonsignori, Il fallimento. 
23 As argued by Robert, toward the end of the nineteenth century, “La liquidation 
judiciaire et la faillite sont deux procédures qui … tendent au même but, la sauvegarde 
des intérêts des créanciers” (“liquidation judiciaire and faillite are two procedures … 
aiming at the same goal, the safeguard of creditors interests”), from Robert, De la 
liquidation judiciaire des sociétés, 11. This view has been recently reinforced by De 
ruysscher. Describing the aim of prebankruptcy proceedings, he argues: “Legislators 
could secure the cooperation of insolvents, but this was not per se combined with efforts 
of continuity of business or corporate rescue,” from De ruysscher, “At the End, the 
Creditors Win,” 3. 
24 We do not include special procedures only open to specific debtors, such as 
cooperative firms, insurance companies, banks, etc. 
25 For instance, we did not include the reforms passed in France (1905), Austria (Law 16 
March 1884, G.U. n.35 and n. 36), and Greece (Law of 22 February 1910). Conversely, 
we included as “change” the laws passed in Germany (1898), Italy (1865), and Ireland 
(1872), given that formally they fully replaced the preceding law. 
26 For instance, English judges’ acceptance of the so-called floating charge is considered 
to have profoundly changed the functioning of corporate insolvency law, see Franks and 
Sussman “Financial Innovation.” However, the extent to which such developments in 
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judicially sanctioned law continued into the twentieth century has been open to debate, 
see Armour “Floating Charge” and Coyle and Turner “Law, Politics, and Financial 
Development.”  
27 Both the database and the list of sources by country are available on request. 
28 The legal origins concept—the idea that nations belong to specific legal families—was 
originally developed by legal scholars such as Zweigert and Kötz (An Introduction to 
Comparative Law). It has subsequently been used by economists to analyze the pattern of 
development of national legislation over time. This approach tries to explain why some 
countries (the ones belonging to the Anglo-Saxon group) tend to have legal institutions 
more suitable to promote long-term growth (for an overview of this literature, see La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, “The Economic Consequences”). This approach 
has been challenged by business historians—for a recent survey, see Musacchio and 
Turner, “Does the law and finance hypothesis”. 
29 In constructing this variable we include countries that later became independent but 
were, at the time, part of bigger political entities that possessed bankruptcy institutions. 
For example, countries such as Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland, which were part of the 
Russian empire, or areas under the Austrian rule. Conversely, we do not include 
independent countries (such as Belgium or Norway), which used customary solutions or 
legislation/commercial codes developed by other independent countries. 
30 Countries have been classified according to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer in 
“The Economic Consequences.” Communist countries, not analyzed by La Porta et al., 
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have been classified in the German family if previously part of the Austro-Hungary 
empire, or in the French family if originally part of the Russian Empire. Rumania is 
classified as belonging to the French family. Bulgaria adopted German law in all areas 
but in bankruptcy, for which it used the French model (Société de Législation Comparé, 
Annuaire de législation étrangère 1898), hence it is considered as part of the French 
family.  
31 See Bonsignori, Il fallimento, for Italy, Tambacopoulos, “The Bankruptcy Laws of 
Greece” for Greece, and De ruysscher, “At the End, the Creditors Win” for Belgium and 
Holland.  
32 This was certainly the case in 1930s Greece, when scholars argued that “provisions on 
Bankruptcy of the Greek Commercial Law are now considered as antiquated ones, the 
modern Law on bankruptcy not having been taken into view, as for instance the German 
one.” Tambacopoulos, “The Bankruptcy Laws of Greece,” 155.<AQ>Okay to close 
quotation marks after “one”?</AQ> 
33 Sgard, “Do Legal Origins Matter?” 
34 See, Levi and Moore, “Bankruptcy and Reorganization,” for the United States, and del 
Marmol, La faillite en Droit Anglo-Saxon, for continental Europe. 
35 See, De ruysscher, “At the End, the Creditors Win,” for Holland, and Bonsignori, Il 
fallimento, for Italy. 
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36 Several changes occurred relatively early in the crisis: Yugoslav law changed in 1930 
(accounting for three instances of change, as it covered modern-day Croatia, Serbia, and 
Slovenia), whereas Slovak and Czech laws changed in 1931. 
37 Levi and Moore, “Bankruptcy and Reorganization,” 9. 
38 Burniaux, “Establishing Financial Discipline”; Janda and Rakicova, “Corporate 
Bankruptcies in Czech Republic”; Cepec, “Corporate Insolvency Law.” 
39 Given the relative low number of countries with such procedures, in figure 8 we do not 
distinguish between the total sample and countries always included in it. 
40 Robert, De la liquidation judiciaire. 
41 Di Martino and Vasta, “Companies’ Insolvency”; Di Martino and Hautcoeur, “The 
Functioning of Bankruptcy Law.” 
42 For the sake of consistency with table 2, we only include independent countries. 
 
